In December 1999 the European Union (EU) announced its decision to field an autonomous corps-sized military force separate from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) referred to as the European Security Defense Policy. 1 A EU capability to possess an autonomous military force is in the best interest of the United States (U.S.), although realizing such a capability will require strong resolve within the European community. The EU's ESDP has significant dynamics that warrant analysis in order to acquire an educated appreciation for advantages and disadvantages from a U.S. perspective. The purpose of this research project is to analyze why U.S. should support ESDP and why the European community must exercise strong resolve in order to field ESDP successfully. The analysis focuses on the following areas: 1) Background, the significant biases and strategies peculiar to the United States and Europe with respect to defense; 2) The reasons why the EU initiated ESDP; 3) The initial response from the U.S. and NATO; 4) Issues of friction generated from ESDP; 5) Potential advantages of ESDP to the U.S.; 6) The current ESDP situation; 7) Recommendations for the U.S. position on ESDP; and 8) Conclusions. This analysis does not fully capture the ramifications resulting from the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. because these ramifications have not become manifest at the time this analysis was conducted.
BACKGROUND.
At first glance the EU's decision to implement ESDP might appear as a logical initiative (no significant repercussions if ESDP succeeds or fails). This "logical initiative" becomes complicated quickly once U.S. and European cultures and strategies are examined. This section provides necessary background information in order to gain an appreciation for the complexities associated with ESDP.
THE DEFINITION OF ESDP.
The EU views ESDP as an integral instrument of power to garner international respect.
The EU is determined to employ a force capable of executing missions across the spectrum of conflict, in response to an international crisis.2 The "Petersberg Tasks" codify the ESDP charter. The EU will employ ESDP when "...NATO as a whole is not engaged." 3 Specifically, NATO must approve the EU's request for use of NATO assets and capabilities in order to execute an operation under the EU's command and control. 4 Additionally a NATO European commander will command the force. 5 The Petersberg Tasks articulate that ESDP will contribute to intemational security as per the principles of the United Nations (UN) and other European charters. Missions include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and crisis management (peacemaking) 6 tasks. Additionally the EU "...recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council with regard to international peacekeeping and security." 7 The calendar year 2003 headline goal for the EU is to have the ESDP (a corps-size force of 60,000 troops) capable of deploying within 60 days and sustainable for up to one year. ESDP will have organic command and control, intelligence, logistic operating systems, as well as strategic lift transportation. 8 U.S. TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY.
The current U.S.National Security Strategy (December 2000) articulates transatlantic security as a strategic objective for the United States. 9 U.S. military forward presence is the primary method for achieving transatlantic security. Eventually a multinational protection force (MPF) led by Italy was deployed in May 1997. 21 The 1997 Albania crisis revealed the unsuitability of the WEU to react to crises. Although the intent in both operations was noble and within the Petersberg Tasks framework, the execution was not successful (slow to mature, lack of consensus, and lack of unity of effort). Some U.S. policy makers surmise the genesis of ESDP is the EU's embarrassment over its dependency on U.S. military capabilities. 22 The actual genesis for ESDP may in fact be that the United States is getting what it has been asking for: a stronger, more independent Europe, 23 Europe as more regionally oriented, not globally oriented as the U.S. views Europe. A regional oriented defense structure is far less expensive to maintain than a globally oriented power. The EU is quick to cite that its generous host nation su'pport to the United States coupled with economic assistance to economically challenged European states 26 off-set the perceived huge burden sharing imbalance (although an argument can be made that economic assistance does nothing for the NATO alliance). Despite the collective potential of Europe, EU leaders recognize the absence of "broad capabilities" essential to shaping international environments (which precludes global orientation). 27 The absence of broad capabilities generate from legitimate legal stipulations European countries are subjected to. NATO membership stipulates each nation maintain a viable defense establishment. Independent national defense forces preclude a "theoretical economy of scale" analogous to the United States. 28 Instead of being able to capitalize on diverse industrial, economic, and technological strengths and synergistically mold a cohesive military capability, European countries are bound to uphold honor by maintaining separate independent military capabilities. The EU does have "consortium" capability as evident from the Eurofighter aircraft and Airbus strategic cargo airframe. 29 The EU approaches deterrence by "encouraging good behavior" instead of "the big stick" approach (which is how the EU characterizes the U.S. approach). 33 Europeans do not rush into programs. The EU also believes that addressing the roots of conflict (poverty, social inequities)
is the correct way to enhance stability and security. The ESDP evolution illustrates the slow, deliberate treaty/summit processes the EU executes and is accustomed to (it took from 1991 until 1997 for the EU to codify ESDP's operational concept and associated tasks). 34 The EU's "soft" approach makes sense considering it does not possess "the big stick" capability the United States enjoys. The U.S. missile defense (MD) initiative has raised significant angst and protest from within the European community. From a European perspective MD could upset the status quo because it makes the U.S. appear to act "recklessly" in a stable environment. 35 The EU is concerned about MD rekindling a new arms race 36 (with China and/or Russia) and destabilizing the European continent. More importantly, the Europeans place great faith in treaties. The fear is that the abrogation of the ABM Treaty will lead to a domino effect with other treaties.
The EU is frustrated by the U.S. unilateral "big stick" approach to deterrence and potential threat to the stabilizing affects of the status quo. The EU is very sensitive to U.S. unilaterlism because it undermines dialogue and consultation on issues that could affect the European continent. The United States pays a price for military superiority, sometimes it manifests in categorically being labeled as a unilateralist, insensitive to allied countries' views and concerns.
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY.
A popular criticism of the European community is its reluctance to resource adequately its militaries. This perceived reluctance fuels the overarching burden sharing complaint a lot of United States Congressmen maintain towards Europe. Upon closer examination of the European economy, it becomes evident that economic priorities, legalities, and finite resources dictate and influence defense spending to a higher degree than the "reluctance" factor.
Domestic social welfare programs are the economic priority in Europe. Current economic trends indicate these social welfare programs are taking a heavy toll on the economy.
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However, lower priorities, like defense, are done under an extremely constrained environment.
European NATO countries strain to invest 2.2% of the collective GDP into NATO (compared to the U.S. investment of 3.3% of its GDP). 38 
EU countries that belong to the European Monetary
Union must keep deficits under 3% of their GDP. This strict spending ceiling severely limits defense spending throughout the EU. 39 The United States government does not have the same restrictions as evidenced by the government's deficit spending practices that fueled the huge U.S. military build up in the 1980's. The United States spends about 40% of its defense budget to maintain existing force structure and approximately 25% to buy new equipment. 4° The EU collectively spends 60% of the defense budget towards maintaining current troop levels and only 16% of the defense budget to buying new equipment. 4 1 This budget apportionment results in a severely restricted research and development capability within the EU.
The United States spent $37 billion on research and development in 1999 compared to a combined EU NATO member total of $9 billion. 42 The small research and development 5 investment accounts for the huge technology gap between the United States and Europe.
Some argue the EU countries have been accustomed to the security of the U.S. nuclear "umbrella" and mutual support, which manifests small defense budgets. 43 to prevent the EU from inheriting a suspect country, the possibility still exists that the EU might have to direct economic support to these potential fragile economies at the expense of properly resourcing defense (ESDP).
NATO-DCI, ANOTHER EU ECONOMIC BURDEN.
NATO's Kosovo Operation Allied Force resulted in the NATO leadership critically analyzing the allies' performance. The NATO leadership identified fifty-nine issues associated with the Kosovo campaign that must be rectified in order for NATO to be more strategically and operationally proficient. These significant issues were categorized into five broad capabilities that NATO wants to improve. The formal title of this initiative is "NATO-DCI" (Defense Capabilities Initiative) and the broad capabilities include: 1) mobility and deployability;
2) sustainability; 3) effective engagement; 4) survivability; and 5) interoperable communications. 7 There are expensive, highly sophisticated platforms involved (armored gun system, ballistic missiles, precision guided munitions). 4 8 An obvious ramification of NATO-DCI is the economic price tag NATO EU countries must now pay if this initiative is to succeed. The challenge reverts back to Europe's ability to capitalize on its consortium potential. For NATO-DCI to succeed, NATO and the EU must work through potential issues generated from military efficiency and national agendas, and alliance cohesiveness and ESDP headline goals. thereby enhancing U.S. military agility (for example, the United States forces could hand-off stabilization force missions to the ESDP and execute other missions). Another suspect speculation posits the EU turning its back on the U.S. once the EU has military self-sufficiency. 70 The EU does not espouse ESDP as a European defense panacea, rather a program to improve military capabilities.71 As stated earlier in section II (The reasons why the EU wants ESDP), ESDP could provide low intensity capabilities, not European military self-sufficiency.
Additionally, the EU will not "turn its back" on an ally that has been forged on huge sacrifices and mutual respect over the course of two world wars and over forty years of collective defense (at least without significant debate). The subject of duplication is another ambiguous issue that must be resolved. A majority of the key actors emphatically warn against duplication (doubling the demand for scarce resources between NATO and ESDP). ESDP will prove counter productive if parallel military and political bureaucracies materialize between NATO and ESDP. 78 The real issue is separating necessary from unnecessary duplication due to finite European resources (funding, manpower, and equipment). Establishing separate planning staffs between NATO and ESDP is an example of unnecessary duplication that must be avoided includes. If separate staffs results, conflicting objectives may preclude the NATO Secretary General's demand for indivisibility (less unity of effort between NATO and ESDP). On the other hand, some duplication is essential for ESDP to be successful. Due to limited strategic lift and transport systems, ESDP must plan on using existing NATO strategic lift assets. Intelligence and communications architecture and equipment should be duplicated in order to enhance interoperability and compensate for current NATO shortfalls in these operating systems7 9 A significant detrimental repercussion to NATO may result if ESDP cannot resource necessary duplication in the aforementioned systems. The ESDP equipment shortfall will exacerbate existent NATO shortages and strain present day NATO levels if ESDP deploys. Non-EU NATO countries should be concerned about the prospect of ESDP "robbing" NATO resources. 80 The European economy poses a significant challenge for resourcing ESDP. There are multiple competing demands that preclude EU countries from having the luxury of focusing expected levels of funding on ESDP. As mentioned, NATO-DCI and EU expansion will stress and compete for EU economic resources. Additionally EU "power" countries (Germany, France, EU must obtain better-cost effectiveness via redesign of defense budgets and recognize "cooperative" international structures. 85 Although these WEU strategists may have the appropriate remedy, revising defense budgets will be a Herculean task. The EU leaders are faced with the formidable task of improving on efficiencies within their respective defense structures, or increase defense funding at the expense of sensitive social programs.
The U.S. Missile Defense (MD) initiative presents a complicated dynamic for the EU and ESDP. Some EU leaders cannot imagine any potential adversary attacking the United States with missiles. 86 The EU fears an MD program may rekindle a new arms race with potential competitors like Russia and China. 87 Although the U.S. MD will remain extremely sensitive with the EU, its angst will probably abate considering: 1) Russia's preliminary willingness to work with the U.S. on MD and reduction of its nuclear arsenal, decreasing the specter of a new arms race; and 2) the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack which proved every country is vulnerable to potentially any type of weapon of mass destruction. NATO will more than likely forge a constructive relationship with the EU members while ESDP develops, and the necessary duplications and counter productive duplications sort out. The most significant issues are: 1) The EU's economic ability to resource ESDP while simultaneously resourcing important social programs and NATO-DCI; and 2) The EU gaining a consensus on ESDP command and control, command authority, and transfer of authority.
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES TO THE U.S. 2) The United States must be prepared to interject political pressure if the issue of command and control is not resolved. Despite France's preference for UN command and control for ESDP, the U.S. must apply pressure via its NATO connection to ensure ESDP is synchronized with NATO objectives. There is too much opportunity for conflict of interests if ESDP operates under authority external to NATO. As long as the EU adheres to Albright's "3 D's" or Robertson's "3 I's," ESDP will stay synchronized with NATO.
-3) The United States must be prepared to interject if the EU becomes too ambitious with ESDP, especially with respect to the area of operations orientation. The United States should pressure the EU to keep ESDP restricted to the European region in lieu of a global orientation.
The EU does not have economic resources necessary to support a global orientation (robust strategic transportation and logistic systems). A global orientation will more than likely overstress ESDP and raise the possibility of U.S. economic assistance. The United States should encourage the EU to focus ESDP on Petersberg Tasks (peacekeeping, constabulary operations). This low intensity focus is usually less costly (less expensive platforms) and provides agility (reduces stress on limited strategic transportation assets). A reaction force that focuses on low intensity operations is easier to train and less expensive (compared to high intensity operations).103 A low intensity focus for ESDP offers the EU a number of advantages.
If recruiting (for the necessary ESDP manpower requirements) becomes difficult, the EU may have to rely on new member nations to resource ESDP manpower requirements. Perspective new EU members will come from Europe's less economically developed and stable regions.
Low intensity focus is better suited for a less experienced and equipped force. Additionally, new member country assimilation could be expedited if these new countries have a significant role in EU institutions like ESDP. Because the EU is expanding into less stable regions, a stability trained force like ESDP could provide the EU a significant return on its investment by maintaining stability while these regions mature.
4) Finally, the United States may need to provide some economic aid if the EU's economy becomes over burdened by ESDP.
CONCLUSIONS.
A successful ESDP is in the best interest of the United States. The primary issue is European resolve. The center of gravity for a successful ESDP is the European's political will.
Europe's political leadership must confront sensitive economic issues and be prepared to subordinate explosive social programs to ESDP funding if ESDP is to succeed. The EU members must be prepared to subordinate national interests to collective European interests if ESDP is to succeed. The EU cannot afford to fall prey to an over ambitious program. The EU should focus ESDP on low intensity operations (humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping)
proficiency executing missions over a European region orientation.
The EU must be prepared to stay the course with ESDP when friction emerges (especially economic problems). Europe's reputation is at stake with ESDP. Europe must not abandon the EU's ESDP initiative otherwise the EU will have to answer to another failed military initiative.
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